The aim of the present study was to carry out a qualitative and quantitative synthesis of the existing literature studying the relationship between emotional intelligence and risk behavior. We conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis of the scientific evidence available relating both constructs. Particular attention was paid to identifying possible differences in this relationship as a function of the different conceptualizations of EI and the risk domain. The study was conducted following the Cochrane and PRISMA guidelines. Our results revealed a (...) significant negative relationship between EI and health-related risk behaviors. However, this relationship was not observed in other risk domains such as finance and gambling. The relationship between EI and risk behavior differed according to the risk domain studied, which supports the notion that risk is a domain-specific construct. The results associated with the health-related risk behaviors are consistent with existing literature about the positive impact of emotional abilities on the health domain. A more complete understanding of the emotional mechanisms that underlie risk behavior could help to establish action guidelines and improve programmes to prevent and reduce the negative effects of risk behavior on our society. (shrink)

The objective structured clinical examination is a method for assessment clinical competencies and skills. However, there is a need to improve its design in psychology programs. The aim of this study was to analyze the effect of the different scenario's presentation order with different complexity/difficulty on the autonomic stress response of undergraduate students undergoing a Psychology OSCE. A total of 32 students of Psychology Bachelor's Degree were randomly selected and assigned to two OSCE scenarios of different complexity. While undergoing the (...) scenarios, participants heart rate variability was analyzed as an indicator of participant's stress autonomic response. Results indicate that the order of presentation of different complexity/difficulty scenarios affects the autonomic stress response of undergraduate Psychology students undergoing an OSCE. Students who underwent the high-complexity scenario first, reported significantly higher autonomic stress response than students who began the OSCE with the low-complexity scenario. Highly complex or difficult scenarios require good executive functions or cognitive control, very sensitive to autonomic stress responses. Therefore, OSCE design will benefit from placing easy scenarios first. (shrink)

Reliance on intuitive and emotive responses is widespread across many areas of bioethics, and the current debate on biotechnological human enhancement is particularly interesting in this respect. A strand of “bioconservatives” that has explicitly drawn connections to the modern conservative tradition, dating back to Edmund Burke, appeals explicitly to the alleged wisdom of our intuitions and emotions to ground opposition to some biotechnologies or their uses. So-called bioliberals, those who in principle do not oppose human bioenhancement, tend to rely on (...) rational arguments and to see intuitions and emotions mostly as sources of biases. This approach often translates into shifting the burden of proof onto bioconservatives and challenging them to provide arguments against the proposed enhancement to back what bioliberals perceive as merely intuitive, emotive, and irrational reactions. -/- In this article, I am going to show that the methodological divide between bioliberals and bioconservatives is less significant than at first glance it appears to be and less significant than it is often taken to be. I will do so by defending two theses. The first is that reliance on intuitions and emotions is not a prerogative of bioconservatives: bioliberals have their typical intuitions and emotive responses and are for this reason exposed to potential biases in the same way as bioconservatives are. The second thesis is that reliance on intuitions and emotions is not necessarily antithetic to reason and rationality. This latter thesis has been philosophically defended with particular reference to the debate on biotechnologies, while the former is perhaps more controversial and more difficult to accept—at least for bioliberals. In both cases, I will support the claims by drawing on resources from the field of moral psychology and the sciences of the mind and, particularly, by applying to some positions in the enhancement debate recent findings about the role of intuitions and emotions in human moral assessment. This new empirically informed perspective holds promises for solving the methodological controversy between bioconservatives and bioliberals, thus enabling proper dialogue and debate between the two sides. (shrink)

This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, social and political (...) philosophy, medical philosophy, and education. The contributors include scholars from 16 countries. Bunge combines ontological realism with epistemological fallibilism. He believes that science provides the best and most warranted knowledge of the natural and social world, and that such knowledge is the only sound basis for moral decision making and social and political reform. Bunge argues for the unity of knowledge. In his eyes, science and philosophy constitute a fruitful and necessary partnership. Readers will discover the wisdom of this approach and will gain insight into the utility of cross-disciplinary scholarship. This anthology will appeal to researchers, students, and teachers in philosophy of science, social science, and liberal education programmes. 1. Introduction Section I. An Academic Vocation Section II. Philosophy Section III. Physics and Philosophy of Physics Section IV. Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind Section V. Sociology and Social Theory Section VI. Ethics and Political Philosophy Section VII. Biology and Philosophy of Biology Section VIII. Mathematics Section IX. Education Section X. Varia Section XI. Bibliography. (shrink)

This paper deals with structures ${\langle{\bf T}, I\rangle}$ in which T is a tree and I is a function assigning each moment a partition of the set of histories passing through it. The function I is called indistinguishability and generalizes the notion of undividedness. Belnap’s choices are particular indistinguishability functions. Structures ${\langle{\bf T}, I\rangle}$ provide a semantics for a language ${\mathcal{L}}$ with tense and modal operators. The first part of the paper investigates the set-theoretical properties of the set of indistinguishability (...) classes, which has a tree structure. The significant relations between this tree and T are established within a general theory of trees. The aim of second part is testing the expressive power of the language ${\mathcal{L}}$ . The natural environment for this kind of investigations is Belnap’s seeing to it that (stit). It will be proved that the hybrid extension of ${\mathcal{L}}$ (with a simultaneity operator) is suitable for expressing stit concepts in a purely temporal language. (shrink)

Physical activity, and likely the motivation for it, varies throughout the day. The aim of this investigation was to create a short assessment (CRAVE: Cravings for Rest and Volitional Energy Expenditure) to measure motivation states (wants, desires, urges) for physical activity and sedentary behaviors. Five studies were conducted to develop and evaluate the construct validity and reliability of the scale, with 1,035 participants completing the scale a total of 1,697 times. In Study 1, 402 university students completed a questionnaire inquiring (...) about the want or desire to perform behaviors “at the present moment (right now).” Items related to physical activity (e.g., “move my body”) and sedentary behaviors (e.g., “do nothing active”). An exploratory structural equation model (ESEM) revealed that 10 items should be retained, loading onto two factors (5 each for Move and Rest). In Study 2, an independent sample (n= 444) confirmed these results and found that Move and Rest desires were associated with stage-of-change for exercise behavior. In Study 3, 127 community-residing participants completed the CRAVE at 6-month intervals over two years- two times each session. Across-session interclass correlations (ICC) for Move (ICC = 0.72–0.95) and Rest (ICC = 0.69–0.88) were higher than when they were measured across 24-months (Move: ICC = 0.53; Rest: ICC = 0.49), indicating wants/desires have state-like qualities. In Study 4, a maximal treadmill test was completed by 21 university students. The CRAVE was completed immediately pre and post. Move desires decreased 26% and Rest increased 74%. Changes in Move and Rest desires were moderately associated with changes in perceived physical fatigue and energy. In Study 5, 41 university students sat quietly during a 50-min lecture. They completed the CRAVE at 3 time points. Move increased 19.6% and Rest decreased 16.7%. Small correlations were detected between move and both perceived energy and tiredness, but not calmness or tension. In conclusion, the CRAVE scale has good psychometric properties. These data also support tenets of the WANT model of motivation states for movement and rest (Stults-Kolehmainen et al., 2020a). Future studies need to explore how desires to move/rest relate to dynamic changes in physical activity and sedentarism. (shrink)

Just Ecological Integrity presents a collection of revised and expanded essays originating from the international conference "Connecting Environmental Ethics, Ecological Integrity, and Health in the New Millennium" held in San Jose, Costa Rica in June 2000. It is a cooperative venture of the Global Ecological Integrity Project and the Earth Charter Initiative.

In the tree-like representation of Time, two histories are undivided at a moment t whenever they share a common moment in the future of t. In the present paper, it will first be proved that Ockhamist and Peircean branching-time logics are unable to express some important sentences in which the notion of undividedness is involved. Then, a new semantics for branching-time logic will be presented. The new semantics is based on trees endowed with an indistinguishability function, a generalization of the (...) notion of undividedness. It will be shown that Ockhamist and Peircean semantics can be viewed as limit cases of the semantics developed in this paper. (shrink)

In the vast literature on human rights and natural law one finds arguments that draw on science or mathematics to support claims to universality and objectivity. Here are two such arguments: 1) Human rights are as universal (i.e., valid independently of their specific historical and cultural Western origin) as the laws and theories of science; and 2) principles of natural law have the same objective (metahistorical) validity as mathematical principles. In what follows I will examine these arguments in some detail (...) and argue that both are misplaced. A section of the paper will be devoted to a discussion of arguments relying on the historical and cultural specificity (and intrinsic superiority) of Western science. The conclusion is that both science and mathematics offer little help to anyone wanting to make use of them as paradigms of universality, objectivity, and rationality. Finally, I will draw some consequences for the idea of human rights. (shrink)

Resumen: El corpus, siendo una herramienta eficaz, se está empleando en múltiples ámbitos, entre los que se encuentran los estudios de traducción. Sin embargo, dicho recurso no se utiliza con mucha frecuencia en las investigaciones traductológicas cuando una de las lenguas en cuestión es chino clásico (la lengua escrita empleada antiguamente en China), y autores que sí hacen estas investigaciones suelen no mencionar los pasos a seguir cuando se trata un corpus paralelo ad hoc. El objetivo del presente artículo es (...) presentar cómo se elabora un corpus paralelo chino clásico-español tomando como ejemplo la novela histórica Romance de los Tres Reinos y sus traducciones al español. Para ello, hemos descrito la problemática de creación y explotación de este tipo de corpus, siguiendo el orden de las fases del proceso. Resulta que algunas fases del proceso son universales, mientras que otras son propias de lenguas clásicas y de la combinación lingüística chino-otra lengua, en cuyo caso sí faltan aplicaciones eficaces. Con el trabajo, esperamos deparar información a los estudiosos que quieran realizar y profundizar las investigaciones basadas en corpus paralelo y en las obras clásicas de China. Abstract: The corpus, being an effective tool, is utilized in multiple fields. One of them is the Translation. However, this resource isn´t used frequently in translation studies when one of the languages in question is classical chinese (written language used anciently in China). And when it comes to an ad hoc parallel corpus, the steps of how to create it are usually omitted by researchers who make such investigations. The objective of this article is to present how to elaborate a classic Chinese-Spanish parallel corpus taking as example the historic novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms and its two translations into Spanish. To reach the objective, we have described the problem of creation and exploitation of this type of corpus, following the order of the phases of the process. We’ve found that some of the phases are universal while other phases are unique for old languages and for the linguistic combination Chinese-other language. And in this latter case, there’s a lack of effective applications. With the current work, we hope to offer useful information to those scholars who are willing to carry out their own investigations based on self-built parallel corpus and at the same time related to the classic Chinese works. (shrink)

Summary: Responding to Laudan’s skeptical reading of history an influential group of realists claim that the seriously wrong claims past successful theories licensed were not really implicated in the predictions that once singled them out as successful. For example, in the case of Fresnel’s theory of light, it is said that although he appealed to the ether he didn’t actually need to in order to derive his famous experimental predictions—in them, we are assured, the ether concept was “idle,” “inessential,” “peripheral” (...) or worse. This view, developed by J. Worrall and P. Kitcher in the 1980s and subsequently supplemented by J. Leplin and by S. Psillos has received critical attention in the literature over the last decade, but more needs to be said on the subject—or so I suggest in this paper. I bring forward four converging argumentative lines to show how and why, from the days of Fresnel to at least the decade after the Michelson-Morley experiments, the ether functioned and was understood as an “essential” posit in physics. My first line draws Fresnel’s actual deployment of the ether concept and the way he and his circle understood the achievements of his theory. The second line draws is from epistemological assessments of surprising implication in theories and its impact on leading theorists in the last two-thirds of the century. The third line draws from discussions of the optical ether in end-of-century reports circa 1900. The fourth focuses on entrenched metaphysical assumptions that persisted in the practice of physics until the advent of special relativity. Pulling these four lines together shows, I think, why attempts at synchronic identification of sound theory-parts are bound to fail, and also how realists might try to meet the challenge this creates. (shrink)

Some authors argue that it is permissible for clinicians to conscientiously provide abortion services because clinicians are already allowed to conscientiously refuse to provide certain services. Call this the symmetry thesis. We argue that on either of the two main understandings of the aim of the medical profession—what we will call “pathocentric” and “interest‐centric” views—conscientious refusal and conscientious provision are mutually exclusive. On pathocentric views, refusing to provide a service that takes away from a patient's health is professionally justified because (...) there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to refuse to provide that service (e.g., it does not heal, and it is contrary to the goals of medicine). However, providing that same service is not professionally justified when providing that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. Likewise, the thesis turns out false on interest‐centric views. Refusing to provide a service is not professionally justified when that service helps the patient fulfill her autonomous preferences because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to provide that service (e.g., it helps her achieve her autonomous preferences, and it would be contrary to the goals of medicine to deny her that service). However, refusing to provide that same service is not professionally justified when refusing to provide that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. As a result, on either of the two most plausible views on the goals of medicine, the symmetry thesis turns out false. (shrink)

Summary: Responding to Laudan’s skeptical reading of history an influential group of realists claim that the seriously wrong claims past successful theories licensed were not really implicated in the predictions that once singled them out as successful. For example, in the case of Fresnel’s theory of light, it is said that although he appealed to the ether he didn’t actually need to in order to derive his famous experimental predictions—in them, we are assured, the ether concept was “idle,” “inessential,” “peripheral” (...) or worse. This view, developed by J. Worrall and P. Kitcher in the 1980s and subsequently supplemented by J. Leplin and by S. Psillos has received critical attention in the literature over the last decade, but more needs to be said on the subject—or so I suggest in this paper. I bring forward four converging argumentative lines to show how and why, from the days of Fresnel to at least the decade after the Michelson-Morley experiments, the ether functioned and was understood as an “essential” posit in physics. My first line draws Fresnel’s actual deployment of the ether concept and the way he and his circle understood the achievements of his theory. The second line draws is from epistemological assessments of surprising implication in theories and its impact on leading theorists in the last two-thirds of the century. The third line draws from discussions of the optical ether in end-of-century reports circa 1900. The fourth focuses on entrenched metaphysical assumptions that persisted in the practice of physics until the advent of special relativity. Pulling these four lines together shows, I think, why attempts at synchronic identification of sound theory-parts are bound to fail, and also how realists might try to meet the challenge this creates. (shrink)

This article presents the first comprehensive study of Syriac rhetoric in late antiquity. It builds on existing scholarship on the Syrians’ engagement with Graeco-Roman paideia and Christian rhetoric, but it also goes further in that it draws attention to the Syrians’ participation in Near Eastern rhetorical traditions (mainly transmitted through Aramaic) and in the rhetoric of the Hebrew Bible, which was translated into Syriac without Greek intermediaries. At the same time, this article demonstrates that Syriac rhetoric flourished in distinctive and (...) original ways: It developed its own literary genres (with a strong predilection for poetry and a sensibility for gendered voices), performative settings (including the liturgy and the school), and thematic domains (notably Scriptural exegesis and religious controversy). It is especially remarkable that an elaborate “meta-rhetorical” reflection flourished in Syriac, as it first emerged in the work by Antony of Tagrit in the ninth century and in the broader context of late antique and Byzantine Aristotelianism. This comprehensive survey and its conceptual systematisation are designed to facilitate further research on Syriac rhetoric both during late antiquity and in later centuries, when the Syrians’ interaction with Arabic rhetoric came to play an increasingly influential role.Syriac words are given in a simplified transcription. For consonants, the standard system in use for Semitic languages is followed; spirantisation of b g k p t is marked by v gh kh f th respectively. East Syrian vocalisation is generally adopted unless the words are quoted from a West Syrian author; vowel length is not marked, with the exception of a/ā and e/ē in Eastern Syriac. (shrink)

This ar ti cle has as ob jec ti ve for mu la tes a cri tic to Ri chard Rorty`s an ti mar xism and his de fen se of the po li ti cal li be ra lism. The ar ti cle tries to do it, in first pla ce, des cri bing the phi lo sop hi cal cri tic of Rorty to Marx; in se cond pla ce iden tif ying two in t..

Aujourd’hui, le thérapeute psychanalytique de couple ( tpc ) ne se réfère que rarement dans sa pratique au sexuel et à la sexualité. L’auteur étudie cette évolution en proposant deux hypothèses. Les orientations théoriques les plus répandues parmi les tpc auraient-elles une influence sur la difficulté à intégrer le sexuel et les troubles sexuels du couple dans l’analyse des cas? La spécificité de ce cadre, un couple/un analyste, n’y joue-t-elle pas un certain rôle? L’auteur rappelle le travail d’auto-analyse du thérapeute (...) en soulignant que pour comprendre les dynamismes en jeu on doit entendre le cadre comme développant un espace psychique inédit, un chaudron néogroupal. Trois exemples cliniques illustrent ces idées. (shrink)

Aujourd’hui, le thérapeute psychanalytique de couple ( tpc ) ne se réfère que rarement dans sa pratique au sexuel et à la sexualité. L’auteur étudie cette évolution en proposant deux hypothèses. Les orientations théoriques les plus répandues parmi les tpc auraient-elles une influence sur la difficulté à intégrer le sexuel et les troubles sexuels du couple dans l’analyse des cas? La spécificité de ce cadre, un couple/un analyste, n’y joue-t-elle pas un certain rôle? L’auteur rappelle le travail d’auto-analyse du thérapeute (...) en soulignant que pour comprendre les dynamismes en jeu on doit entendre le cadre comme développant un espace psychique inédit, un chaudron néogroupal. Trois exemples cliniques illustrent ces idées. (shrink)

RésuméL'emploi inadéquat du terme » primitif « est la conséquence d'une confusion entre la primitivité réelle des formes archaïques et la » primitivité « secondaire des formes spécialisées.Dans toute évolution, la transition du simple au complexe et celle de l'indistinct au distinct suivent des modalités semblables. On y reconnai̊t une phase d'enrichissement lent, une phase de polymorphisme originel, et une phase de ségrégation et de spécialisation. Il est nécessaire de distinguer entre:1. la simplicité archaïque des formes authentiquement primitives et la (...) simplicité secondaire des formes pseudo‐primitives, appauvries et spécialisées;2. le polymorphisme originel et le polymorphisme secondaire, dǔ à l'hybridation.ZusammenfassungDie unangebrachte Anwendung des Ausdruckes » primitiv « ist Folge einer Konfusion zwischen der wirklichen Primitivität der archaischen Formen und der sekundären Primitivität der spezialisierten Formen.In jeder Entwicklung erfolgt der Übergang vom Einfachen zum Komplexen und vom Unbestimmten zum Bestimmten in ähnlicher Art und Weise. Man erkennt eine vorbereitende Phase der langsamen Bereicherung, eine Blütezeit des ursprünglichen Polymorphismus, und eine späte Phase der Absonderung und Spezialisierung.Es ist notwendig zu unterscheiden zwischen:1. Der archaischen Einfachheit der wirklich primitiven Formen und der sekundären Einfachheit der pseudoprimitiven Formen, die verarmt und spezialisiert sind;2. dem ursprünglichen Polymorphismus und dem sekundären Polymorphismus, der durch Vermischung entstanden ist.The inadequate use of the term » primitive « is due to a confusion between archaïc primitivity proper, and secondary » primitivity « or pseudoprimitivity. In any kind of evolution, the transitions from simplicity to complexity and from indistinctness to distinctness follow strictly similar courses. Three phases are recognizable: a pre‐apogean phase of slow enrichment, an apogean phase of original polymorphism, and a post‐apogean phase of segregation and specialization. It is necessary to distinguish between:1. the archaic simplicity of truly primitive forms and secondary simplicity of impoverished and specialized forms;2. original polymorphism and secondary polymorphism due to hybridization. (shrink)

The success of a scientific theory T is not an all-or-nothing matter; nor is a theory something one can usually accept or reject in toto (i.e. one may take T as being "approximately true", or take as true just certain "parts" of it, without necessarily affirming every posit and claim specific to T as being either completely right or completely wrong). This, however, raises questions about precisely which parts of T deserve to be taken as approximately true. on the basis (...) of its success. A line of thinkers, particularly Kitcher, Leplin and Psillos, variously look for parts of a theory they can claim to have been "essentially" implicated in its distinctivesuccess, which they regard as primary candidates for realist truth ascription. But, how is one to determine which parts of any theory are "central" or "peripheral", "essential" or "idle" in the required sense? Attempts at spelling out relevant synchronic links between successful predictions and correct partial theorizing increasingly look like a misguided effort. As an alternative, this paper proposes a weaker, but arguably powerful enough, version of the realist relation between success and truth. Focusing on a pivotal case study in recent debates between realists and anti-realists (the conceptual changes undergone by theories oflight in the 19th century), a promising link between success and partial theoretical representation is located in the expansion and stabilization of approximately correct partial theoretical models of the theory's intended domain. The realist link is then formulated accordingly. In the resulting approach (a) predictive success is preserved as a marker of cumulative theoretical gain, but (b) specification of the latter is a diachronic rather than synchronic matter (i.e. gains become clear only after generations of theory change; specification of the particular loci of theoretical gain in connection with a given line of predictive success is not assumed to be generally possible at the time of the success in question). The truth ascriptions that get licensed are partial-of a piece-meal and retrospective sort, focused on methodologically specifiable theoretical subplots from past science. (shrink)

The success of a scientific theory T is not an all-or-nothing matter; nor is a theory something one can usually accept or reject in toto (i.e. one may take T as being "approximately true", or take as true just certain "parts" of it, without necessarily affirming every posit and claim specific to T as being either completely right or completely wrong). This, however, raises questions about precisely which parts of T deserve to be taken as approximately true. on the basis (...) of its success. A line of thinkers, particularly Kitcher, Leplin and Psillos, variously look for parts of a theory they can claim to have been "essentially" implicated in its distinctivesuccess, which they regard as primary candidates for realist truth ascription. But, how is one to determine which parts of any theory are "central" or "peripheral", "essential" or "idle" in the required sense? Attempts at spelling out relevant synchronic links between successful predictions and correct partial theorizing increasingly look like a misguided effort. As an alternative, this paper proposes a weaker, but arguably powerful enough, version of the realist relation between success and truth. Focusing on a pivotal case study in recent debates between realists and anti-realists (the conceptual changes undergone by theories oflight in the 19th century), a promising link between success and partial theoretical representation is located in the expansion and stabilization of approximately correct partial theoretical models of the theory's intended domain. The realist link is then formulated accordingly. In the resulting approach (a) predictive success is preserved as a marker of cumulative theoretical gain, but (b) specification of the latter is a diachronic rather than synchronic matter (i.e. gains become clear only after generations of theory change; specification of the particular loci of theoretical gain in connection with a given line of predictive success is not assumed to be generally possible at the time of the success in question). The truth ascriptions that get licensed are partial-of a piece-meal and retrospective sort, focused on methodologically specifiable theoretical subplots from past science. (shrink)

Las interpretaciónes de la física cuántica de Everett-DeWitt hablan de una multiplicidad de mundos físicamente coexistenrtes. Éstas imaginativas reacciones a los problemas conceptuales de la mecánica cuántica estándar forman una família de propuestas de “universos múltiples” que, sin pleno éxito, han sido tachadas de incoherentes.Everett-DeWitt interpretations of quantum physics speak of a multiplicity of physically coexisting worlds. These imaginative reactions to the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics form a family of physicalist “many-worlds” proposals that have been variously dismissed as (...) “incoherent”, so far without full success. A renewed charge by Hilary Putnam now seems to pose deeper trouble for PMW. In a recent paper, he seizes on “Schrödinger’s cat” situations to expose how PMW relativization of actuality and basic combinatorics jointly ruin probabilistic talk. Putnam focuses on confirmation and luck. His case against PMW is thought-provoking but also questionable, or so I suggest in this paper. First I argue that, as presented, Putnam’s charge doesn’t go through. I then consider his argument proper. According to Putnam, experimental DeWittians must count themselves as “lucky” in a seriously incoherent sense. I consider his take on “luck” and deny that defenders of PMW need to so regard themselves. Although extravagant, their position cannot be fruitfully dismissed as incoherent on metascientific grounds. Indeed it attests to the way science rationally helps the imagination to grow. (shrink)

The semantical structures called T x W frames were introduced in (Thomason, 1984) for the Ockhamist temporal-modal language, $[Unrepresented Character]_{o}$ , which consists of the usual propositional language augmented with the Priorean operators P and F and with a possibility operator ◇. However, these structures are also suitable for interpreting an extended language, $[Unrepresented Character]_{so}$ , containing a further possibility operator $\lozenge^{s}$ which expresses synchronism among possibly incompatible histories and which can thus be thought of as a cross-history 'simultaneity' operator. (...) In the present paper we provide an infinite set of axioms in $[Unrepresented Character]_{so}$ , which is shown to be strongly complete for T x W-validity. Von Kutschera (1997) contains a finite axiomatization of T x W-validity which however makes use of the Gabbay Irreflexivity Rule (Gabbay, 1981). In order to avoid using this rule, the proof presented here develops a new technique to deal with reflexive maximal consistent sets in Henkin-style constructions. (shrink)

The success of a scientific theory T is not an all-or-nothing matter; nor is a theory something one can usually accept or reject in toto (i.e. one may take T as being "approximately true", or take as true just certain "parts" of it, without necessarily affirming every posit and claim specific to T as being either completely right or completely wrong). This, however, raises questions about precisely which parts of T deserve to be taken as approximately true. on the basis (...) of its success. A line of thinkers, particularly Kitcher, Leplin and Psillos, variously look for parts of a theory they can claim to have been "essentially" implicated in its distinctivesuccess, which they regard as primary candidates for realist truth ascription. But, how is one to determine which parts of any theory are "central" or "peripheral", "essential" or "idle" in the required sense? Attempts at spelling out relevant synchronic links between successful predictions and correct partial theorizing increasingly look like a misguided effort. As an alternative, this paper proposes a weaker, but arguably powerful enough, version of the realist relation between success and truth. Focusing on a pivotal case study in recent debates between realists and anti-realists (the conceptual changes undergone by theories oflight in the 19th century), a promising link between success and partial theoretical representation is located in the expansion and stabilization of approximately correct partial theoretical models of the theory's intended domain. The realist link is then formulated accordingly. In the resulting approach (a) predictive success is preserved as a marker of cumulative theoretical gain, but (b) specification of the latter is a diachronic rather than synchronic matter (i.e. gains become clear only after generations of theory change; specification of the particular loci of theoretical gain in connection with a given line of predictive success is not assumed to be generally possible at the time of the success in question). The truth ascriptions that get licensed are partial-of a piece-meal and retrospective sort, focused on methodologically specifiable theoretical subplots from past science. (shrink)

The transition semantics presented in Rumberg :77–108, 2016a) constitutes a fine-grained framework for modeling the interrelation of modality and time in branching time structures. In that framework, sentences of the transition language \ are evaluated on transition structures at pairs consisting of a moment and a set of transitions. In this paper, we provide a class of first-order definable Kripke structures that preserves \-validity w.r.t. transition structures. As a consequence, for a certain fragment of \, validity w.r.t. transition structures turns (...) out to be axiomatizable. The result is then extended to the entire language \ by means of a quite natural ‘Henkin move’, i.e. by relaxing the notion of validity to bundled structures. (shrink)

A central debate in the current philosophical literature on temporal experience is over the following question: do temporal experiences themselves have a temporal structure that mirrors their temporal contents? Extensionalists argue that experiences do have a temporal structure that mirrors their temporal contents. Atomists insist that experiences don’t have a temporal structure that mirrors their contents. In this paper, I argue that this debate is misguided. Both atomism and extensionalism, considered as general theories of temporal experience, are false, since temporal (...) experience is not a single undifferentiated phenomena as both theories require. I argue for this conclusion in two steps. First, I show that introspection cannot settle the debate. Second, I argue that the neuroscientific evidence is best read as revealing a host of mechanisms involved in temporal perception - some admitting of an extensionalist interpretation while others admitting only of an atomistic interpretation. As a result, neither side of the debate wins. (shrink)

This research aims to monitor the current situation of confinement in Spanish society motivated by COVID-19 crisis. For this, a study of its socio-family, psychological and educational impact is conducted. The sample (N= 165 families, 89.1% nuclear families with children living in the same household and 20.5% with a relative in a risk group) comes from the Aragonese region (Spain). The instruments used are: Beck-II Depression Inventory (BDI-II); Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright’s Empathy Quotient (EQ) with its cognitive empathy subscale, as well (...) as an ad-hoc questionnaire, reviewed by a panel of experts, to learn about socio-personal, family and housing conditions, use of technology, involvement in school tasks and household, and working condition. The multiple regression analysis results show that the anxiety derived from the current situation is explained in 23.1% (p< 0.001) by the variables: gender (t = -2.31,p= 0.022), level of Internet consumption (t = 2.139,p= 0.034), increase of family conflicts (t = 2.980,p= 0.003) and help with school tasks (t = 2.980,p= 0.040). On the other hand, cognitive empathy is explained in 24.6% (p< 0.001) by the variables: gender (t = -4.690,p< 0.001) and mother’s hours of teleworking (t = 2.101,p= 0.037). All this leads us to conclusions related to preventive systems of social, psychological, and educational aspects to better serve families. These conclusions can be also be transferred to the future with an inclusive care to family settings from those three parameters. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The humble origins of Russell's paradox by J. Alberto Coffa ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS Russell pointed out that the discovery of his celebrated paradox concerning the class of all classes not belonging to themselves was intimately related to Cantor's proof that there is no greatest cardinal. lOne of the earliest remarks to that effect occurs in The Principles ofMathematics where, referring to the universal class, the class of all (...) classes and the class of all propositions, he notes that when we apply the reasoning of his [Cantor's] proofto the cases in question we find ourselves met by definite contradictions, of which the one discussed in Chapter x is an example. (P. 362) And in a footnote he adds: "It was in this way that I discovered this contradiction". Throughout his writings Russell left a number ofhints concerning the sort of connection he had drawn between Cantor's proof and his own discovery. In fact, his suggestions are so specific that there would seem to be little room left for speculation concerning how the discovery took place.2 The picture that emerges almost immediately from Russell's observations is the following. For reasons which are 1 See, e.g., Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1937), §§100, 344-9; G. Frege, Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976), pp. 215-16; B. Russell, Essays in Analysis, ed. D. Lackey (New York: George Braziller, 1973), p. 139; B. Russell, Introducrion to Mathemarical Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 136; B. Russell, My Philosophical Development (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), pp. 75-6; The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, I (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), 195. 2 See, e.g., Ch. Thiel's "Einleitung des Herausgebers" in Frege, Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, pp. 203 and 216 (footnote), and 1. Grattan-Guinness, "How Bertrand Russell Discovered his Paradox", Historia Marhematica, 5 (1978),127-37. 31 32 Russell, nos. 33-4 (Spring-Summer 1979) never made clear, Russell decided to analyze Cantor's argument applying it to "large" classes such as the universal class V, and the class of all classes. When, for example, we consider V, its power set and the correlationf(x) = {x} if x is not a class, f(x) =. x otherwise, then Cantor's diagonal class D turns out to be the class of all classes not belonging to themselves. Moreover, since the element ofV which is taken toD byfisD itself(i.e., sincef(D) = D), Cantor's reasoning invites us to raise the question whether D belongs tof(D) (i.e., toD) or not; and it establishes that it does precisely if it doesn't.3 The purpose of this note is to present recently uncovered information that complements and corrects our present understanding of Russell's discovery of his paradox. As it turns out, far from originating from his desire to apply the ideas in Cantor's theorem, a version of Russell's paradox first occurred in an argument that Russell had devised, late in 1900, in order to establish the invalidity of that theorem. An appeal to "large" classes such as V or Class was, as we shall see, essential to Russell's attempted refutation. As he displayed the details of his counterexample Russell's paradox emerged, at first unrecognized, as the by-product of a project that the paradox itself would eventually undermine. In a paper written in 1901 and largely devoted to a popular exposition and defence of Cantor's theory of the infinite, Russell expressed what appeared to be a rpinor reservation to Cantor's treatment : There is a greatest of all infinite numbers, which is the number of things altogether, of every sort and kind. It is obvious that there cannot be a greater number than this, because, if everything has been taken, there is nothing left to add. Cantor has a proof that there is no greatest number, and if this proof were valid, the contradictions of infinity would reappear in a sublimated form. But in this one point, the master has been guilty of a very subtle fallacy, which I hope to explain in some future work.4 3 See Principles, §349. Perhaps I should remind... (shrink)

[book blurb:] The world is changing so fast that it's hard to know how to think about what we ought to do. We barely have time to reflect on how scientific advances will affect our lives before they're upon us. New kinds of dilemma are springing up. Can robots be held responsible for their actions? Will artificial intelligence be able to predict criminal activity? Is the future gender-fluid? Should we strive to become post-human? Should we use drugs to improve our (...) intimate relationships — or to reduce crime? Our intuitions about questions like these are often both weak and confused. -/- David Edmonds has put together a philosophical task force to get to grips with these challenges. Twenty-nine philosophers present provocative and engaging pieces about aspects of life today, and life tomorrow — birth and death, health and medicine, brain and body, personal relationships, wrongdoing and justice, the internet, animals, and the environment. The future won't look the same when you've finished this book. (shrink)

The transition semantics presented in Rumberg (J Log Lang Inf 25(1):77–108, 2016a) constitutes a fine-grained framework for modeling the interrelation of modality and time in branching time structures. In that framework, sentences of the transition language L_t are evaluated on transition structures at pairs consisting of a moment and a set of transitions. In this paper, we provide a class of first-order definable Kripke structures that preserves L_t-validity w.r.t. transition structures. As a consequence, for a certain fragment of L_t, validity (...) w.r.t. transition structures turns out to be axiomatizable. The result is then extended to the entire language L_t by means of a quite natural ‘Henkin move’, i.e. by relaxing the notion of validity to bundled structures. (shrink)

En un estilo claro, despojado de t rminos t cnicos, Alberto Clemente de la Torre traza un recorrido por los principales t picos de la f sica cu ntica destinados a todos aquellos que quieren descubrir uno de los temas m s sugerentes de la ciencia contempor nea, sin exigirles Para ello conocimientos previos.

The semantical structures called T×W frames were introduced in (Thomason, 1984) for the Ockhamist temporal-modal language, ℒO, which consists of the usual propositional language augmented with the Priorean operators P and F and with a possibility operator ⋄. However, these structures are also suitable for interpreting an extended language, ℒSO, containing a further possibility operator ⋄s which expresses synchronism among possibly incompatible histories and which can thus be thought of as a cross-history ‘simultaneity’ operator. In the present paper we provide (...) an infinite set of axioms in ℒSO, which is shown to be strongly complete forT ×W-validity. Von Kutschera (1997) contains a finite axiomatization of T×W-validity which however makes use of the Gabbay Irreflexivity Rule (Gabbay, 1981). In order to avoid using this rule, the proof presented here develops a new technique to deal with reflexive maximal consistent sets in Henkin-style constructions. (shrink)

In 1911, the prominent Italian Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ernesto T. Moneta and, with him, a number of Italian “pacifists” actively supported the invasion of Libya (carried out) by the Italian army. On the columns of “La Vita Internazionale”, journal edited by Moneta since 1898, Italian “pacifists” not only agreed that it was good and convenient for Italy to conquer a part of North Africa, but showed an enthusiasm they had never manifested before in support of pacifist initiatives. The question (...) is why an ardent pacifist and wise intellectual, as Moneta was, renounced so easily his pacifist ideals to support a bloody war and a harsh repression of the Arab rebels, as the one which followed the defeat of the Turkish army. To answer this question, the essay analyzes the articles published by Moneta and other contributors on “La Vita Internazionale” and discusses them with regard to both the international political events occurred during the first decade of the 20th century and the dominant ideologies of the time (namely irrationalism and anti-individualism). The essay concludes that Moneta's agreement with the colonialist war has been prepared and made possible by a number of pre-war ideological and political influences which had transformed his democratic and peace-oriented ideas of nation, people and state into nationalist and aggressive ones. (shrink)

Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby (2024) argues that “[i]t is time for bioethics to end talk about personhood” (11). The author calls on the field to ask different kinds of normative questions about the mo...

The holist and inferential condition that, according with Davidson, defines imperatively the cognitive process collides with the existence of the intuitive believes, that is to say, those believes that are of themselves the fundamentum and that, thus, don’t require other belief for their grounds. Nonetheless, if, for one part, is adopted the way in which Peirce understands the term “intuition” and, for another, is accepted the extension of inferential holism, is allowed, even so, to admit the existence of intuitive believes, (...) without transgressing the Davidsonian prohibition. Indeed, if the inferential basis of supported belief is located beyond of the individual agency of who support that belief, the very belief would count as intuition of the agent and would respect the Davidsonian holist constraint, in the sense that such a belief would be a belief whose basis would be in another belief, even when that belief was one that was in an external agency. The key for to accomplish this purpose is to sustain a reasoning extended theory —analogous to the Clark and Chalmers (1998) extended theory of mind—, by virtue of which the agent can obtain, from an intuitive assistant —as alien inferential authorship — what he cannot get by his own inferential authorship. Precisely, in this work we will expound a Davidsonian type of linguistic interaction model —namely, dialogic and triangular—, for cognitions persuasive transfer, by means of one’s reasons (the assistant) become other’s intuitions (the assisted). (shrink)

O pensamento filosófico hispânico na segunda metade do séc. XX, potenciou um processo de emancipação cultural e filosófica mais profundas, que destacaram o sentido e o alcance de uma utêntica filosofia, no continente sul-americano. Com tomada de consciência da circunstância americana o que está em causa, é a procura e busca de uma autenticidade da razão latino-americana, a qual na análise que desenvolvo, só terá sentido se integrada numa dinâmica de integração cultural. Esta deverá sempre partir das circunstâncias próprias, e (...) desenvolvida a partir do respeito por um ethos vivencial comum. O presente estudo foi inspirado na obra de Carlos Beorlegui, intitulada Historia del pensamiento filosófico latinoamericano (2004), obra esta que nos apresenta uma visão geral da Filosofia latino-americana desde as cosmovisões pré-colombianas até às correntes filosóficas mais actuais, como é o caso da FL (Filosofia da Libertação), e a da pós-Modernidade ou pós-Colonialidade, comummente conhecida como interculturalismo. (shrink)

We encounter autonomy in virtually every area of philosophy: in its relation with rationality, personality, self-identity, authenticity, freedom, moral values and motivations, and forms of government, legal, and social institutions. At the same time, the notion of autonomy has been the subject of significant criticism. Some argue that autonomy outweighs or even endangers interpersonal or collective values, while others believe it alienates subjects who don't possess a strong form of autonomy. These marginalized subjects and communities include persons with physical or (...) psychological disabilities, those in dire economic conditions, LGBTI persons, ethnic and religious minorities, and women in traditional communities or households. This volume illuminates possible patterns in these criticisms of autonomy by bringing to light and critically assessing the contribution of women throughout the history of philosophy on this important subject. The essays in this collection cover a wide range of historical periods and influential female philosophers and thinkers, from medieval philosophy through to contemporary debates. Important authors whose work is considered, among many others, include Hildegard of Bingen, Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, Mary Wollstonecraft, Susan Moller Okin, Hélène Cixous, Iris Marion Young, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. Women Philosophers on Autonomy will enlighten and inform contemporary debates on autonomy by bringing into the conversation previously neglected female perspectives from throughout history. (shrink)

The present article exposes the reasons which Jean Baudrillard says that it there is a loss of aesthetic illusion in the art-object of the simulation. Those reasons would prevent to the new artistic piece the chance to generate a symbolic level and it would lead to disappearance of the art. That is the reason which Baudrillard’s thought is designated apocalyptic. The article’s hypothesis is that the loss of aesthetic illusion announced by Baudrillard can be understood analyzing the way in that (...) technology transforms the experience between the men and the objects in the capitalist system. Thus, in terms of method, the artistic image is seen like a sign-object inside the society and it is in the middle of two ways to mean the experiences: the representation and the simulation. In the margin of the thesis’s results, which are the foundation of this text, the article’s final section recommends to pay attention to a double apocalyptic condition in Baudrillard, this with the purpose to realize that the French sociologist doesn’t deny the possibility to find in the technologic process the ironic return of the illusion. (shrink)

We encounter autonomy in virtually every area of philosophy: in its relation with rationality, personality, self-identity, authenticity, freedom, moral values and motivations, and forms of government, legal, and social institutions. At the same time, the notion of autonomy has been the subject of significant criticism. Some argue that autonomy outweighs or even endangers interpersonal or collective values, while others believe it alienates subjects who don’t possess a strong form of autonomy. These marginalized subjects and communities include persons with physical or (...) psychological disabilities, those in dire economic conditions, LGBTI persons, ethnic and religious minorities, and women in traditional communities or households. This volume illuminates possible patterns in these criticisms of autonomy by bringing to light and critically assessing the contribution of women throughout the history of philosophy on this important subject. The essays in this collection cover a wide range of historical periods and influential female philosophers and thinkers, from medieval philosophy through to contemporary debates. Important authors whose work is considered, among many others, include Hildegard of Bingen, Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, Mary Wollstonecraft, Susan Moller Okin, Hélène Cixous, Iris Marion Young, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. Women Philosophers on Autonomy will enlighten and inform contemporary debates on autonomy by bringing into the conversation previously neglected female perspectives from throughout history. (shrink)

In this detailed study giving more depth and breadth to Moravia’s work than has hitherto been done in English, the authors explore his background and assess his accomplishment as a twentieth-century artist. Students of the modern novel will be interested in the explication given here of the influences of Kierkegaard, Sartre, Camus, and Martin Buber on Moravia’s work.